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Abstract 
 
Using firm level data on 70,000 enterprises in 107 countries, this paper finds 
important effects of access to finance, business regulations, corruption, and to a 
lesser extent, infrastructure bottlenecks in explaining patterns of job creation at 
the firm level.  The paper focuses on how the impact of the investment climate 
varies across sizes of firms.  The differences across size categories come from two 
sources.  First, objective conditions of the business environment do vary 
systematically by firm types.  Micro and small firms have less access to formal 
finance, pay more in bribes than do larger firms, and face greater interruptions in 
infrastructure services.  Larger firms spend significantly more time dealing with 
officials and red tape.  Second, even controlling for these differences in objective 
conditions, there is evidence of significant non-linearities in their impact on 
employment growth.  The results suggest strong composition effects: A weak 
business environment shifts downward the size distribution of firms. In the case 
of finance and business regulations this occurs by reducing the employment 
growth of all firms, particularly micro and small firms. On the other hand,   
corruption and poor access to infrastructure reduce employment growth by 
affecting the growth of medium size and large firms.  With significant differences 
between firms with less than 10 employees and SMEs, these results indicate 
significant reforms are needed to spur micro firms to grow into the ranks of the 
SMEs. 
     4
1. Introduction 
 
An issue of particular relevance for economic growth is how the development of markets and 
institutional infrastructure influence the growth of firms. This issue is even more important in 
developing countries, where markets and institutional infrastructure are less developed.  A 
related concern is whether an adverse business environment shifts the size distribution of firms, 
affecting the size, the efficiency and the dynamism of the business sector. This paper uses firm- 
level data on approximately 70,000 enterprises in 102 developing countries and five high-income 
economies to assess the effects of the broader business environment on employment growth by 
firms, focusing on the size dimension.  
There are a number of recent studies that assess the effect of different dimensions of the 
business environment on firms’ performance. Several examine the effect of employment 
regulations on firms’ adjustment and on labor market outcomes more generally.
1 Others look at 
the effect of regulations of entry of firms on firm creation and growth.
2 A number of them 
investigate the importance of access to finance for firm development and growth.
3 Overall, these 
studies indicate that regulations on labor, barriers of entry for firms, and financing conditions can 
have a direct impact on firms’ employment decisions.  However, other aspects of the business 
environment can affect these decisions as well, raising costs and risks associated with doing 
business or by creating barriers to competition.  By affecting the overall growth prospects, issues 
from the quality of infrastructure, the strength of property rights, the nature and enforcement of 
business regulations and the overall openness in the management of public resources can all 
affect firms’ growth (World Bank, 2004a). This paper looks at the joint and relative importance 
of a number of dimensions of the business environment on firms’ growth.  
A common theme emphasized in many of these studies is that the effect of the business 
environment may not be neutral across firm size. Market failures, or policy created distortions 
can create fixed costs in the operation of business creating cost disadvantages for smaller firms. 
The costs of dealing with credit market information imperfections or with a complex and non-
transparent regulatory environment are some examples of such non-linearities. Large firms may 
                                                 
1 A few recent examples are: Botero et al. (2003), Besley and Burgess (2004), Almeida and Carneiro (2005), 
Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger (2006), Micco and Pagés (2006), Petrin and Sivadasan (2006) and Autor, 
Kerr and Kugler (2007).  
2 For example: Djankov et al (2003) and  Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004).  
3 For example: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) , Demirgüç-Kunt  and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Galindo and Micco (2005).   5
also have more political influence and shape regulations and policies in their favor.  On the other 
hand, smaller firms may benefit from lax enforcement of regulations or lower harassment from 
corrupted public officials. Across the world, a sizeable amount of public resources are devoted to 
the development of micro, small and medium firms, yet unlocking potential constraints to their 
performance is another, perhaps equally effective, development strategy. 
This paper makes a number of contributions.  Using newly available data from the World 
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES), the paper uses comparable firm-level data from over 100 
countries.  In addition to information contained in most firm-level data surveys (employment, 
investment, sales), these data includes measures of multiple dimensions of the business 
environment both objective and subjective at the individual firm level.  This paper explores 
whether such measures vary across types of firms as well as whether a given set of conditions 
have a differential impact on performance across different types of firms. It emphasizes the 
importance of looking at variations within countries, in particular exploring how size, but also 
age, sector and ownership affect results.   
Differential effects across firms of different size can stem from two sources.  First, there 
can be differences in the underlying objective conditions faced by firms.  The paper does find 
that micro and small firms have less access to formal finance, face significantly greater 
interruptions in infrastructure services, and pay more in bribes—as a percentage of sales—than  
than do larger firms.  Larger firms spend significantly more time dealing with officials and red 
tape.  Second, the same conditions can potentially have differential or non-linear effects on 
employment growth by size.  Thus, it could be that the same extent of external finance is more 
beneficial to smaller firms or that the same extent of power outages is less damaging to smaller 
firms.  Indeed, the paper does find that for finance, business regulations and corruption there are 
non-linear effects, with smaller effects for infrastructure variables.   
Taken together, the overall impact of the business environment on firm growth has 
significant size effects.  The paper focuses on four main areas:  access to finance, the regulatory 
environment, corruption and access to infrastructure. The results indicate significant differences 
across size categories of firms—both in terms of differences in objective conditions faced by 
firms, and non-linearities in the impact of these conditions.  Poor access to finance, insufficient 
or poorly developed business regulations, corruption, and infrastructure bottlenecks all shift the 
size distribution of firms downward.  Lack of finance and insufficient or ineffective business   6
regulations reduce employment growth in all firms, but especially in micro and small ones. 
Corruption and poor infrastructure create growth bottlenecks for medium and large firms.    
  The results also show the importance of distinguishing between micro (less than 10 
employees) and small firms (11-50 employees). Results show significant differences in the 
marginal effects across these two size categories for finance, regulatory environment and 
corruption. These differences extend to including the average differences in the objective 
conditions facing these firms in assessing the overall impact of the business environment (i.e., 
evaluating the marginal effect at the average value of objective conditions for each size category 
of firms).  However, either excluding micro firms or combining them with small firms in a single 
category loses the differential impact for finance and regulatory environment between the 
smaller firms and larger ones, diluting the message that smaller firms would benefit from 
business environment reforms. 
There are some methodological issues that need to be addressed, including potential 
measurement error, omitted variable bias and endogeneity.  The analysis is conducted with 
individual survey dummies so that the variation being exploited is within country and survey.  In 
addition to controlling for some potentially important omitted variables, this also controls for 
fixed effects across surveys. Furthermore, to control for possible differences in demand 
conditions, a fuller set of country-industry dummies are included.  Incorporating multiple 
dimensions of the broader business environment simultaneously deals seriously with concerns of 
omitted variable bias of papers that include only a single dimension, such as labor regulations or 
finance. 
To address potential endogeneity, this paper takes two steps.  First, it relies on objective 
rather than subjective measures of the business environment.  Thus, instead of using the extent to 
which firms complain about finance or electricity, it uses information on the actual access to 
trade credit or bank loans, and the frequency of outages and the costs associated with these 
outages.  Second, it uses location-sector-size averages (minus individual firms’ own responses) 
of the business environment measures rather than individual firms’ own responses.  This captures 
the broader environment in which the firm operates and allows the individual firm’s own 
contribution to the average to be excluded.  To ensure adequate numbers of firms in each 
location-sector-size cell average, if there were fewer than four observations dimensions were   7
combined for those firms in the small cell.  The approach also has the benefit of not losing those 
observations where a firm did not answer all the individual investment climate questions.
4   
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes the data.  Section 4 examines how reported constraints vary by types of firms, 
emphasizing the different patterns across different sizes of firms.  Section 5 then looks at how 
objective variables vary across firms, verifying that the subjective responses do reflect actual 
variations in the conditions experienced by different types of firms.  Including lagged 
performance variables in these regressions reinforces the need to address endogeneity—and   
indicate the likely directions that employment growth might have on different dimensions of the 
business environment. Section 6 describes the impact of objective conditions on employment 
growth using location-sector-size averages instead of individual firm responses.  Section 7 
conducts a number of robustness checks.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
There is a growing literature that assesses the effects of the set factors, policies and institutions, 
commonly known as business environment, on the performance of firms and economic growth.
5 
The methodologies used by these studies are very diverse. A number of studies have focused on 
cross-country variation to identify the effect of labor regulations (Botero et al, 2004; Heckman 
and Pagés, 2004), regulation of entry (Djankov et al., 2002) or a wide set of regulations (Loayza, 
Oviedo and Servén, 2005).  These studies relate objective (de jure) measures of regulation at the 
country level to aggregate country outcomes. Although the results are suggestive of the 
importance of appropriate regulations for business development, they suffer from important 
methodological constraints ranging from omitted variable bias to endogeneity concerns.  
Another group of studies employ a difference-in-differences method first developed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). These studies analyze the effect of different aspects of the business 
environment at the country-industry level. The underlying idea behind this method is that if a 
                                                 
4 This approach is very similar to using location-sector-size dummies as instruments (except that the firm’s own 
value is not excluded in this calculation, the number of observations averaged in a cell may be very small, and the 
additional observations cannot be recovered if a single investment climate variable is not available.).  The test of 
overidentifying restrictions could not be estimated using the full specification due to the large number of dummies 
and instruments.  However, in in specifications not using a full set of country-industry dummies, the restrictions 
could not be rejected at the 0.3 level. 
5 Such set of conditions and policies is sometimes also referred as competitiveness (World Competitiveness Report, 
2006-2007)   8
certain condition is restrictive for business development or growth, industries that are extremely 
sensitive to that condition should be relatively more affected than others, and be relatively less 
developed in countries where this issue is more restrictive. Rajan and Zingales (1998)) show that 
industries that inherently require a high share of external financing grow faster in financially 
developed markets. Beck et al. (2004) find that industries with higher shares of small firms grow 
disproportionately faster with greater financial development using the US industry size 
distribution as the ‘natural’ benchmark. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004) show that industries 
in which, due to structural or technological reasons firm entry is more important, exhibit less 
growth in countries with important restrictions to firm entry. Finally, Micco and Pagés (2006) 
show that industries that are inherently more volatile create fewer jobs and are less developed in 
countries with very restrictive hiring and firing regulations.  
  While improving on cross-country studies, the former studies suffer from three potential 
shortcomings that can be addressed in our study.  First, in most cases variation in business 
environment conditions is captured with country level variables that reflect de jure regulations or 
conditions, that is, the procedures and costs that would be incurred if firms fully complied with 
what is on the books.  However, there can be large gaps between what is on the books and what 
is experienced on the ground.  This is particularly true in lower income countries and those with 
higher levels of corruption. (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2007; Kaufmann and Kraay, 
2004).  In that regard, is desirable to have measures of de facto regulation.  
  Second, it is important to explore variation in the business environment not only across 
countries but also within country boundaries—across sub-national areas and especially, across 
firm size and ownership.
6  Having disaggregated variables allows for hypotheses to be tested 
without having to assume that one country is the benchmark or “best” case against which to 
compare other countries.   
  Third, with a few exceptions, studies tend to focus on one given factor or policy, such as 
firing and hiring regulations, regulations on new businesses, or restricted access to finance.  They 
are, therefore, potentially liable to omitted variable bias, as other non-considered aspects of the 
business environment can also affect firms’ decisions. While we look at the effects of individual 
                                                 
6 A few studies assess differences in business environment conditions within countries. Besley and Burgess (2004) 
and Ahmad and Pagés (2007) exploit differences in labor market regulations across Indian states to assess how 
different labor market regulations affect economic performance across Indian states.  Almeida and Carneiro (2005) 
assess the effect of variation of enforcement in labor regulations within Brazil.    9
dimensions of the investment climate, our focus is on regressions that combine multiple 
dimensions in a single regression.  This not only addresses potential bias in the estimates, it 
allows one to test directly which dimensions have the biggest impact on firm performance. 
  A number of recent studies make use of the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES)—a firm-level dataset with 4,000 firms across 54 countries
7—to study the effect of the 
business environment on firm growth. Using subjective firm-level data measures of the business 
environment these studies show the importance of finance, corruption and property rights (Batra, 
Kaufman and Stone, 2003; Ayyagari et al., 2006). Some other studies examine the relationship 
between business environment and firm growth for individual or a small group of countries 
(Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Megistae, 2005, for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China; 
Fisman and Svensson, 2007, and Rienikka and Svensson, 2002, for Uganda; and Bigsten and 
Soderbom, 2006, which reviews the literature for Africa). 
  One central area of focus for this paper is whether there are significant differences in the 
impact across firm types, particularly by firm size.  The literature has largely examined this issue 
with regard to access to finance, generally finding smaller firms are more constrained (Galindo 
and Micco, 2005; Love and Mylenko (2003) and IADB (2007).  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2005) is of particular interest here, as these authors include additional measures of 
corruption and property rights using a firm-level dataset with 4,000 firms in 54 countries.  Using 
firms’ perceptions on potential constraints, they also find patterns across countries, with small 
firms benefiting most from greater financial and institutional development.  Our paper expands 
on this work in several dimensions.  It looks at employment growth as well as sales growth, and 
it nearly doubles the number of countries covered, with country samples approximately five to 
10 times larger.   Whereas Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) use subjective firm 
responses as measures of the business environment at the firm level, we include more objective 
measures (i.e., time spent with officials dealing with permits and licenses rather than a ranking of 
how burdensome red tape is on a scale of 1-5).  We also recognize that  measures of constraints 
could well be endogenous and thus control for this possibility throughout the paper.  We also use 
narrower bands on firm size categories, which leads to some interesting extensions on their 
                                                 
7 The World Business Environment Survey is a precursor to the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey.  The earlier round 
primarily collected perception data regarding constraints and some information on firm performance.  In some 
regions firms only provided information on their employment range, i.e., small, medium, large, making it impossible 
to use that data to study differences between small firms below and above 10 employees.   10
result.  By including a “micro” category of firms with fewer than 10 employees, we find 
significant differences between them and small firms (11-50 workers).  We also find that smaller 
firms benefit most from improved access to finance, but that this is particularly true for micro 
firms.  Broadening the “small” definition actually loses the significance of the differential impact 
of small and large firms.  We also find a more nuanced set of results on corruption.  While bribe 
payments reduce growth of all firms, a more pervasive culture of bribes actually raises the 
relative rates of growth of micro firms. 
We also look at how results vary across country groupings, focusing on income levels 
and find significant results, particularly for finance.  We thus confirm and expand the set of 
results, showing how the impact of investment climate conditions vary across firms, indicating 
ways in which firms can benefit most from reforms.   
 
3. The Data   
 
Our study is primarily based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES), a newly available 
collection of firm-level datasets for 102 developing countries as well as five high-income 
countries.
8  Questionnaires are administered within a framework of common guidelines in the 
design and implementation.
9 The dataset is assembled using the core survey, which is a module 
of identical questions included in all questionnaires, thereby enabling cross-country analyses.  
The data include 69,305 firms from 107 countries in six different regions surveyed during 
the period 2000-2006.
10 Several countries have now conducted a second or third survey.
11  The 
median sample size is 350 firms, with several large countries having substantially larger samples 
(Brazil, China, India, Turkey and Vietnam have samples over 1,500; see Table A1 in the annex.) 
The sample of firms in each country is stratified by size, sector and location.
12 Because of this 
                                                 
8  The terms Enterprise Surveys  includes BEEPS, Investment Climate Surveys and RPED surveys.  
9 From http://rru.worldbank.org/InvestmentClimate/Methodology.aspx 
10 The exact set of questions asked does have some variation across countries, particularly among the earlier surveys, 
so regressions with multiple investment climate variables are based on a smaller set of approximately 48,000 firms 
in 80 countries. 
11 While efforts are shifting to building a panel dataset, most repeat surveys have been additional cross-sections.  
There are approximately 2,000 firms that enter twice in the dataset. 
12 From http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/default.aspx#weights: ES have been conducted following 
simple random sampling or random stratified sampling. In a simple random sample, all members of the population 
have the same probability of being selected and no weighting of the observations is necessary. In a stratified random 
sample, all population units are grouped within homogeneous groups and simple random samples are selected within 
each group   11
stratification, large enterprises are in general over-sampled in the ESs compared to their share in 
the number of firms, but not in terms of their contribution to GDP. The unit of analysis is the 
“Establishment” in the manufacture and service sectors.
13  Most firms are registered with local 
authorities, although they may be only in partial compliance with labor and tax authorities.  
The ES data was developed to provide information on aspects of the investment climate 
faced by firms as well as information on firms’ performance. It contains subjective and objective 
information on the business climate faced by individual firms. Regarding subjective measures, 
there is one question that asks firm managers the extent to which various aspects of the 
investment climate are perceived as obstacles to firms’ operations and growth on a scale of 0 (no 
constraint) to 4 (very severe). These perceptions are useful, as they implicitly include a measure 
of impact.  Firms are not asked to evaluate an issue in isolation, but rather in terms of how it 
affects their ability to operate and grow their business.  Thus, areas that may be associated with 
long delays or high costs—but that that are of marginal interest to the firm or for which 
alternatives are available—are not likely to score high on these constraints rankings.  They also 
give some insight into the likely areas where constraints are likely to be different by size of firm.  
Access to finance, corruption, regulations and infrastructure are among the issues with the 
biggest relative differences across size of firms, and particular attention is therefore focused on  
these dimensions in their impact on firm growth.  
  However, there are potential drawbacks to using subjective data.  There is a concern that 
firms’ perceptions of the business environment reflect differences in firm types or firms’ 
performance.  It is well known that successful entrepreneurs are by nature more adept at 
responding to opportunities and overcoming barriers, and they may also see their environment as 
less limiting than less successful entrepreneurs.   We control for this by including firm 
characteristics and measures of firm performance directly in the regression.  We also control for 
individual effects by looking at relative rankings.  Respondents rank 17 issues on the same scale.  
De-meaning the responses gives the relative importance of the issue to that firm.  How well these 
subjective rankings reflect actual conditions can also be tested for.  Using 104 countries, 
Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007) find that the subjective rankings are highly correlated 
                                                 
13 In Europe and Central Asia, the unit is the “firm.” In all other regions it is the plant or establishment.  As over 90 
percent are single-plant firms, the distinction is not likely to affect the results.   12
with objective measures in 16 of the 17 variables.
14  The subjective rankings are also 
significantly correlated with external sources, including Doing Business indicators.    Pierre and 
Scarpetta (2004) use 38 countries and confirm that countries with more restrictive labor 
regulations are associated with higher shares of firms reporting labor regulations as constraining.  
The dataset also contains a set of objective measurements or time or monetary costs of 
those same perceived aspects of the investment climate as they are being experienced by the 
firm.  The larger set of variables that measure finance, infrastructure, regulations and corruption 
are in the Appendix.
15 Our analysis uses subjective measures to gauge the relative importance of 
each issue to a firm, and then uses the larger set of objective variables to measure the effect of 
the business environment on employment growth. Endogeneity is likely to be more of a concern 
if one were to use the perception data as independent variables.  However, there is still some 
concern that endogeneity is important in more objective measures too. The growth of the firm is 
likely to affect whether the firm receives external finance and may well affect the extent to which 
it needs to interact with officials or be subject to demands for “additional payments.”  To control 
for this, we use country-city-sector-size averages in place of the firm’s own values of the 
investment climate variables. Averages are calculated based on actual size at period t and should 
capture the environment in which a firm of a given size operates in period t while still excluding 
the firm’s own values.  Using averages also allows for some observations to be kept despite one 
or more investment climate variables not being reported.  As some country-city-sector-size cells 
are small, a particular dimension was collapsed to ensure at least three firms other than the firm 
in question were used in calculating the averages. In our estimates, we allow for clustering of the 
error terms at the country-city-sector-size level.  
The dataset includes information on many firm characteristics such as size, age, location, 
export activity, ownership, and industry. This is an important feature of the data, which allows 
expanding previous cross-country analyses attempting to assess the economic impact of 
institutions. Institutions can differently affect different types of firms. Small firms, for instance,  
face different constraints than large firms, and a capital-intensive manufacture firm may face 
different restraints than a service-oriented firm. Likewise the degree of impact that a particular 
business constraint has on a firm’s performance can be different for different types of firms. The 
                                                 
14 The one exception was finance; those with loans complained more about the cost of finance than those without 
loans. 
15 See Table A2 for summary statistics of the list of investment climate variables: perceptions and costs   13
firm characteristics used in this study include: five size classes (micro 1-10 permanent 
employees, small 11-50, medium 51-200, large 201-500, and very large firms -more than 500 
employees); three age categories (young 1-5 years, mature 6-15, and older–more than 15); two 
location types (capital or cities with 1 million population and cities with population less than 1 
million); ownership (whether foreign  or  government represents 10 percent or more of 
ownership); whether the firm is an exporter (10 percent or more of sales); and a two-digit 
industry classification.  
The sample contains a large proportion of small firms (63 percent, including 29 percent 
micro and 34 percent small firms); only 14 percent are large and very large firms. The sample 
also consists largely of young firms; 64 percent of the firms have been in operation only 15 years 
or less (19 percent of the dataset five or fewer years and 45 percent between six and 15 years).
16  
According to the 10-percent thresholds noted above, 13 percent of the firms are foreign-owned,  
7 percent are state-owned firms, and 20 percent of firms are exporters. By industry, 31 percent of 
the sample includes capital-intensive manufacturing, 34 percent includes labor-intensive 
manufacturing, and 27 percent consists of services.
17 
We focus on the employment growth of permanent workers as our outcome variable of 
interest. We use permanent employment because this is most likely to reflect long-run 
determinants of performance, because it more closely reflects the concerns of policymakers and 
because there are differences in the consistency of reporting across some countries. Our measure 
of employment growth is the change in the enterprise’s permanent employment during the period 
t and three years before, divided by the firm’s simple average of permanent workers during the 
same period.
18 The measure is symmetric around zero and bounded by values -2, and +2. While 
monotonically related to the conventional growth rate and a second order approximation of the 
logarithmic first difference, this measure allows computing meaningful growth rates for firms 
suffering sharp expansions or contractions, avoiding any arbitrary treatment of outliers. Thus, 
even when by construction our sample does not have entry or exit of firms, some firms 
experience sharp changes in employment due to its early/late stage of development. Young, 
small firms may experience very large growth in their labor force; Bankrupt firms or firms on the 
                                                 
16 See Table A3 for a complete stratification of sample by firm characteristics 
17 The remaining 8 percent represents activity. Classification adapted from PADI (Programa de Análisis de la 
Dinámica Industrial), ECLAC. See Katz and Stumpo (2001).  
18 This measure has been extensively used to measure job creation and job destruction (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1992, and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1999)   14
verge of closure may suffer very large contractions prior to their final exit from the market. Due 
to data availability, employment growth refers to different periods for different firms. 
The regressions include individual country survey dummies.  Thus the focus is on the 
within-country variations rather than across countries.  This decision reflects several factors.  
First, there is substantial variation of investment climate indicators within countries and we want 
to test if its impact is significant.  Second, it controls for potential omitted variables at the 
country level.  Third, it could control for some possible measurement errors or differences in 
implementation across countries.  As Haltiwanger and Schweiger (2005) note, there are some 
countries with particularly high net employment rates.  However, there is a strong country- 
specific component, such that country effects yield relative magnitudes of job creation and 
employment growth. He also noted that the relationships of employment variations between size 
and age classes appear right. Thus, small and younger firms have higher job creation and 
destruction than older and larger firms within the country, when considering total employment.  
Therefore, statistical methods that remove country level are appropriate to draw conclusions 
within countries on the difference of the impact of Investment Climate on different types of 
firms. To account for differences in demand conditions and productive structure, the regressions 
also include a full set of industry-country dummies.  
Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation of the employment growth measure for 
all relevant variables in the sample. There is positive employment growth across all firm sizes 
and income levels. The average firm level employment growth, according to our measure, is 
0.103; small and medium firms grew over the average, while micro and large firms grew below 
average.  Likewise, younger firms  (0.193) grew faster than middle-age  (0.10) and mature firms 
(0.03).  
 
4.  Which Dimensions are Reported to be Most Constraining? Variations in 
Subjective Investment Climate Constraints by Firms 
 
The ranking of potential constraints on the operations and growth of their business provide a 
useful starting point in identifying areas of the investment climate that is worth investigating as 
well as indicating areas where there are significant differences across types of firms.  The 
questions are asked in the same way so that it is possible to look at relative rankings (see Table 2 
for a description of these and the rest of business environment variables used in this study).   15
Having the long list of issues allows for an individual fixed effect to be controlled for. This 
removes concerns about different degrees of optimism or pessimism across individuals, as well 
as any fixed effect stemming from their performance. 
Table 3 reports the regressions of the relative ranking
19 of key constraints on a large set of 
individual firm characteristics at time t, lagged performance (t-1), sector dummies and country 
dummies. The growth measure is lagged to have it be pre-determined, but the claims here are not 
causal.  We are simply interested in describing the patterns across firms.   
It is striking that differences across current size are not consistent across subject areas.  
Looking at the relative rankings of constraints, there are a number of areas that constrain the 
micro firms more than their larger counterparts. These are: cost of and access to finance, 
infrastructure (electricity) and corruption.
20  By far the biggest difference is in access to finance 
(Column 1).  Whereas finance ranks among the top two issues for micro and small firms, it is 
sixth for large firms. The average demeaned level of complaint is 0.32 (i.e., 0.32 units above the 
average level of complaint), it is 0.05 units lower for small firms compared to micro, while it 
falls more than 0.13 units for medium firms, and by 0.2 units for large and very large firms.
21   
Infrastructure is another area where small firms report the greatest relative constraints, 
particularly for electricity (Column 5).  The average relative complaint is -0.04, but it declines a 
further 0.045 units for larger firms.  Smaller firms are more likely to be in areas without access to 
electricity or to be dependent on an unreliable public grid, given that they lack the scale 
economies to make a generator cost effective.   
A final area where micro and small firms are relatively more likely to report the issue as a 
top constraint is corruption (Column 4).  For very large firms, the rate falls by 0.075 units, from 
an average of 0.28 to 0.205. This could reflect the fact that small firms face little recourse to 
demands for bribes and thus they are easier targets for officials seeking additional funds.  To the 
extent that many are operating semi-informally they may face the need to pay bribes to avoid 
higher penalties associated with non-compliance of tax or regulatory requirements.  It is also 
                                                 
19 The relative value results from subtracting the mean value of all the obstacles from each individual answer. 
Consistency of regulations (in column 5) is part of a different set of questions and cannot be examined in relative 
terms.   
20 Tax rates and administration, competition from informal firms and crime were other areas where smaller firms 
report relatively greater constraints.  However, as we do not have as good objective measures corresponding to these 
issues, we concentrate on finance, corruption and reliable infrastructure. 
21 Units here refer to a relative measure defined as y-x where y and x can take values between 1 to 4 and therefore y-x 
can take values between  -3 and 3.   16
likely that bribes for particular services are a fixed sum, which will represent a higher share of 
costs for small firms. 
In turn, larger firms report being relatively more constrained by labor regulations 
(Column 3). This could reflect higher exposure to enforcement—an issue examined in the next 
section—or higher constraints on their activity. The differences are large, with the relative 
complaint for large firms at about 0.20 units larger than for micro firms. The extent of the 
relative constraint increases monotonically with size, consistent with enforcement increasing 
with firm size.
22 Yet, large firms are also relatively more likely to report regulations as being 
applied consistently (Column 2). It would then appear than micro and small firms are less 
constrained by (labor) regulations but are subjected to a higher degree of discretion in the 
application of labor and other regulations. Higher discretion may be related to corruption, which 
also appears as a top constraint for the smaller firms.   
In most cases, the patterns with firm age mirror fairly closely those of size.  Younger 
firms are relatively more constrained by the cost and access to finance and by electricity 
shortages.  
 
5.   Variations in Objective Investment Climate Conditions by Firms 
Differences in perceived constraints could be due to differences in the objective conditions 
facing firms and/or due to differential impacts of the same condition on different firm’s 
performance.  Looking how objective measures vary across different types of firms there is a lot 
of evidence that the former is true.  This is also borne out by significant correlations between the 
constraints and related objective measures. Within each of the categories for which we have 
objective data, firms with the greatest delays and greatest costs are significantly more likely to 
rank these issues as constraining (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2007).  The next section then 
looks at the extent to which the overall constraint affects performance as well as whether there 
are non-linearities in these effects. 
 
                                                 
22 In unreported results, we also find that overall, micro firms report a lower level of constraints than larger firms. 
This finding is consistent with the view that many small firms remain very small or operate in the informal economy 
as a way to avoid higher regulatory burdens.  It raises the challenge of how to increase the incentives of micro firms 
to grow and to comply with more of the regulatory requirements.     17
  Table 4 reports how the objective measures of the investment climate vary across types 
of firms.  The table uses several variables within the same area of the business environment, i.e., 
multiple measures of access to finance, corruption, regulations, and infrastructure.  The aim is to 
show the consistency of results across the variables in the same general area.  In later 
regressions, a variable from each section will be regressed in combination with variables from 
the other areas of the business environment, with substitutions made to indicate the robustness of 
the results. 
Table 4 demonstrates that there are significant differences across firms in most of the 
variables in each of the four areas of the investment climate.   Again, the focus is on differences 
across firms of different size, measured by the level of employment at the time of the survey.  
Micro firms have reported finance as particularly constraining and indeed, controlling for firm 
characteristics and country dummies, large firms are 30 percent more likely to have overdraft 
facilities and the share of investments financed by formal bank loans is 14 percent higher (or 50 
percent more than small firms given retained earnings finance more than two-thirds of 
investments).  Access to formal financing of working capital is also significantly different, with 
large firms’ levels triple that of small firms and quadruple that of micro firms.  What is 
interesting is that the share of sales sold on credit is significantly lower for micro firms, but there 
are then no further differences across sizes of firms.   
Corruption was another area where smaller firms complained more, and the objective 
numbers show that small firms are slightly more likely to pay bribes than either micro firms or 
large firms.  However the real issue is that the size of bribes as a share of sales is almost one-
third higher for small and microfirms relative to medium and large firms.  This can reflect fixed 
payments being relatively larger for small firms, or that they have less recourse to avoid making 
payments.  The payments may also be correlated with the degree of compliance with regulations; 
micro and small firms may not meet all of the requirements and have to pay officials to maintain 
this position. 
Larger firms reported being relatively more constrained by labor inspections and the 
objective data shows that enforcement does increase with firm size, as shown by higher 
frequency or length of visits by labor inspectors.  This is also true of inspections overall, where 
large firms spend 121 percent more time in such inspections relative to micro firms. There is also 
evidence that large firms spend more time dealing with government authorities. On the flip side,   18
larger firms report less delays in getting through customs; either because with larger or more 
regular shipments the clearance procedures are easier, or because larger firms are able to seek 
better treatment (possibly including the payment of “grease” money).  
For infrastructure, the frequency of outages hits small and medium firms hardest and very 
large firms the least.  In addition, the costs of these outages, as a percentage of sales, are 
relatively larger for micro and small firms.  They are less likely to have alternative sources of 
electricity (given the costs of owning and operating a generator).  It is also possible that larger 
firms have a greater choice among possible locations and thus chose to operate in areas with 
more reliable electricity, a hypothesis that is tested for below. 
 
6.   Impact of Investment Climate Conditions on Firm Employment Growth 
This section examines the impact of different measures of the investment climate on employment 
growth, controlling for individual firm characteristics, a full set of country specific industry 
dummies and survey fixed effects.
23 As mentioned above, the possible endogeneity of the 
reported business climate indicators is accounted for by (i) measuring business climate with 
objective rather than subjective indicators, and (ii) averaging the reported measures by firm 
location, industry and size cells, without using the firm’s own response. The specification is as 
follows: 
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where Empgijct,t-3 refers to the growth of employment of firm i in industry j in country c between 
period t and t-3,   small refers to firms between 11 and 50 employees,  medium refers the firms 
between 51 and 200 and large to firms above 200 employees. To avoid a possible feedback from 
employment growth to size, size categories are measured at the initial period of observation 
(generally three years before, but in a few cases, identified by Control EG(1) and Control EG(2), 
                                                 
23 Given that in many instances we have more than one survey per country, the specification includes a whole set of 
individual country-year survey dummies.    19
two or one period before, respectively).  The omitted category is micro enterprises employing 
between 1 and 10 employees. Age of the firm is specified in three categories: young, from 1 to 5 
years old, mature, between 5 and 15 years old and older, above 15 years old. Similarly, Foreign 
takes the value of 1 in firms with more than 10 percent participation of foreign capital and 
exporter identifies firms that export more than 10 percent of their sales at the time of the survey.  
Government identifies firms with participation of more than 10 percent from the government, 
and small_noncapital identifies firms that are in small cities (less than one million habitants) and 
are not in a capital city.  
Additionally, different investment climate variables are interacted with selected relevant 
firms’ characteristics to assess differences in the effect of business climate indicators across 
different types of firms.  ICvariable~i,k refers to an investment climate constraint, such as poor 
infrastructure, or low enforcement of property rights, in city-sector-size-country cell k, with the 
average excluding the firm’s own response. It should be noted that the IC averages are calculated 
based on current sizes, but when included as explanatory variables, they are matched based on 
the initial size of a firm. For example, if a firm was a micro firm three years ago, and three years 
later, at the time of the survey, the firm has become small, the objective IC of this firm enters in 
the computation of the average IC for small firms in cell k. Yet in the regression employment 
growth of firm i is associated with the average IC corresponding to firms’ initial size category. In 
the former example, the above-mentioned firm would be matched to the average IC for micro 
firms.  This assumes that within cell k, the conditions that matter for employment growth are 
those prevalent in the past, and that objective conditions remain constant over time. These 
hypotheses are convenient because they prevent reverse causality from employment growth to 
the IC conditions, as firms may choose to grow/or not grow to face a determined set of IC.   
Reassuringly, correlates of employment growth behave in the expected manner.  Firm 
characteristics, sectors and industry-country dummies are included in the tables, but not reported 
due to space constraints. Employment growth declines monotonically with firm size and age. 
Firms that export and firms with foreign participation grow faster than firms that do not export or 
are domestically owned. Sectors such as leather, garments, wood & furniture as well as trade 
(retail and wholesale) and hotels and restaurants grow at a slower rate than textiles (the omitted 
sector category) while sectors such as agro-industry, beverages, chemicals and pharmacy, the 
manufacturing of paper, construction, and quarrying and mining grow faster.   20
Table 5 shows the effects of the investment climate variables on employment growth.  It 
includes these variables one at a time to illustrate the robustness of the results across different 
variables in the same subject area.  However, while survey dummies control for a large host of 
unobservable number of country and year characteristics, concerns that omitted variable bias 
drives the results still remain. After all, environments characterized by ineffective business 
regulations, or high incidence of corruption are also often characterized by poor infrastructure or 
low access to finance. To overcome some of these concerns, we control for different indicators 
of business climate conditions and their interactions with firm size simultaneously.  Results are 
reported in Table 6.  Tables 8 and 9 show the robustness of results using alternative variables. 
Results in Table 5 and 6 indicate that the effects of investment climate shortcomings 
differ substantially across firm size. They also suggest strong composition effects: A weak 
business environment shifts downward the size distribution of firms. However, the channels by 
which this happens change across business environment dimensions.  
 
Access to Finance 
The impact of better access or lower cost of finances on firms’ growth has been studied by a 
number of authors.
24  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) argue that financial access 
should favor small firms. In their work, they find that firms’ self reported constraints on access 
and cost to finance are associated with lower growth of small firms (relative to large firms).  The 
results presented here use the actual access firms have to different types of finance, from trade 
credit to formal financing of working capital and investments, averaging across location-sector-
size cells and excluding the own firm’s response to minimize possible endogeneity problems.   
Table 4 showed that there are differences in the amounts of finance available, which could 
already explain why smaller firms are more likely to complain about finance (Table 3).  Here, we 
test whether, even for the same amount of financing, the impact would be different across 
different types of firms.  The results show that it is.  It is indeed the smallest (micro) firms that 
gain the most.  Larger firms also gain, but the benefit is about half that enjoyed by micro firms.  
Interestingly, this effect seems to hold both for simpler forms of finance—such as sales on credit 
or overdraft facilities—as well as the more sophisticated bank instruments, such as external 
financing for investments. 
                                                 
24 See for example, Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimov (1998) and Beck Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2005).    21
Our results also indicate a difference in impact between exporters and non-exporters.
25 
Improved access to capital markets appears to favor the growth of non exporters companies 
relative to the growth of companies that cater to the international market. This suggests that 
either exporting firms are better connected to international capital markets and therefore less 
dependent on the mobilization of domestic funds, or, instead, that exporting firms in developing 
countries are in sectors that are intrinsically less dependent on external capital.    
 
Regulatory Environment 
Measures of regulatory environment from Tables 5, 6 and 9 show two trends.  First, they 
reinforce the importance of the consistency of enforcement.  Consistent enforcement is found to 
help the growth of all firms, with particular benefits to small firms (Table 5, row 11).  This is 
particularly encouraging given small firms are the ones that are entering into greater regulatory 
requirements.  They also underscore that not all interactions with officials are detrimental.  They 
imply that some interactions with officials indicate firms are likely accessing needed services, or 
that there is a public good component in increased enforcement of labor regulations or 
regulations in general.  Second, there are costs associated with pure red tape and bureaucratic 
delays.  This is seen most clearly in the costs of delays clearing customs (Table 5, rows 9-10).  
Such delays do hurt all firms but the micro ones. Since very few micro firms engage in 
international trade, they may benefit from the difficulties of competitor firms in getting goods 
through customs.  
  What is interesting is that both of these effects can be seen in a broad measure of 
regulatory environment, namely the share of time managers spend with officials dealing with 
licensing, permits, regulations, etc.  The overall effect is positive, consistent with some 
enforcement being helpful; rather than being a pure measure of regulatory burdens and red tape, 
time spent with authorities may also reflect being engaged with the state and accessing some 
public goods.  What is striking is that this is strongest for micro firms.  Nonetheless, there are 
limits.  Including a quadratic term (Table 6, Column 5) shows that the benefits are offset as the 
overall time managers spend with officials climbs.  For small firms, the marginal contribution 
starts to fall at the 15 percent mark.  More than 20 percent of firms are in the range where the 
marginal contribution is negative and 10 percent where the overall effect is negative.   
                                                 
25 Results are not reported due to space constraints.  Results are available upon request.   22
 
Corruption 
The composition effect is also very strong in environments with a high incidence of corruption.  
Corruption hampers employment growth in small, medium and large firms. This is true 
regardless of whether corruption is measured as incidence of bribes, bribes as percentage of 
sales, incidence of “gifts” to government officials, or gifts as percentage of government 
contracts. Moreover, for at least one of the measures—incidence of bribes—the effect of 
corruption is to increase the growth of micro firms. (Table 5 rows 12-15). The latter effects 
remain when other dimensions of the business environment are included in the specification 
(Table 6, row 1).   
The effect of corruption is large. It is estimated that an increase in the incidence of bribes 
of 10 percentage points reduces the employment rate of large firms by approximately 1.4 points, 
and increases the growth rate of micro firms by 1.4 percent (see Table 5, row 12).  
 
Infrastructure 
Losses associated with the power outages hurt all firms, with larger firms hurt relatively more 
(Table 5, row 17).  With more sophisticated production processes, the same interruption may 
serve to raise the defect rates in a larger batch of output, or customers may be more sensitive to 
delays in production.  What is interesting, however, is that the response to the frequency of 
outages is slightly different and indicates ways that firms respond to situations of unreliable 
power.  When included as the only investment climate constraint, the number of days without 
power (or without water) serve to favor the growth of micro firms.  This may be due to the fact 
that many of the smallest firms chose production technologies that are less dependent on 
electricity and are more labor intensive, so that outages actually favor their growth.  However, 
when infrastructure measures are included with the other investment climate measures (Tables 6, 
8 and 9), the differences in effects across sizes of firms loose significance for all categories 
except medium firms.  Instead, the detrimental impact of outages is felt more keenly by exporters 
and domestically owned firms regardless of size.  
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Testing for Significance of Overall Impact 
These results show both that there are differences in the objective conditions facing firms and 
that even the same objective conditions can translate into different impacts on firm employment 
growth.  To assess the overall impact combining the two types of differences, linear combination 
tests are conducted. For each subject area, the first three tests assess whether the investment 
climate variable has a significant impact on small, medium and large firms respectively.  The 
next three tests assess whether the combined (overall) impact of differences in objective 
conditions and differences in the impact of equal conditions, differs across firm size. That is, 
they test whether the following linear combinations hold   0 = −
w w v v size size size size C I C I β β , where 
v size β  is the coefficient of the size-investment climate interactions for a given size v,  presented in 
Table 6, column 1, and 
v size C I is the sample average value of a given investment climate variable 
for size v. The first test assesses whether the overall impact on large firms is significantly 
different from that of micro firms, followed by whether it is between small and micro and finally, 
between large and small.   
The results, presented in the last column of table 6, indicate that the coefficients for 
finance and regulations, presented in column (1) are significant for all size classes, while the 
impact of bribes is significant for medium-sized and large firms and the effect of infrastructure is 
only significant on medium-sized firms.   
Regarding overall effects, for finance, while the effect of improved access to finance is 
significant across all firms, and larger for micro enterprises, the overall effect is influenced by 
the fact that access to finance increases with firm size. Overall, the combination of both effects 
implies that small firms end up benefiting more, because they have higher access to finance than 
micro firms.  
For management time, the difference in overall impact between large and micro is 
statistically significant.  Micro firms have lower levels of interactions and have higher marginal 
benefits from these interactions, while larger firms are facing the diminishing returns to even 
more interactions with officials.  However, the difference in impact between large and small is 
not significant.  This raises the importance of differentiating between size classes at the lower 
end of the distribution, something that is examined in greater detail below.   24
For bribes, there is an important distinction between the impact of the pervasiveness of 
corruption and the actual costs of corruption (Table 9, comparing columns 1, 2 and 3).  The 
impact of the pervasiveness of corruption hits larger firms relatively more, with smaller overall 
effects on medium and small firms (Table 6, column 6).  However, taking into account the actual 
cost of bribes—and the fact that proportionally they are greater for small firms—the impact is 
actually most detrimental on small firms (Table 9, test column 3).  With micro firms actually less 
hurt than small firms by both the incidence and costs of bribes, this is another area where 
allowing for differentiated effects at the lower end of the size distribution is important.  
 
Addressing Endogeneity 
Table 6 also includes a number of specifications to address endogeneity concerns.  The second 
column includes estimates for the four measures of the investment climate, using the firms’ own 
responses as independent variables.  These results will likely be affected by feedback from a 
firm’s growth experience. In order to properly compare coefficients, results with city-sector-size 
averages (minus the firm’s own response), keeping the same sample size as in column  (2), are 
included in column (3).  In addition to addressing endogeneity concerns, the benefit of using cell 
averages instead of individual firm values is that it allows the sample to be increased to include 
firms that failed to provide an answer to one or more of the investment climate questions.  The 
results with the expanded sample (column 1) are very similar to the results in column (3), 
showing that the results are robust to changes in the sample. 
Comparing the coefficients from the second and third columns gives some indication of 
the extent to which there is a feedback from employment growth to individual responses to 
investment climate measures.  However, it should also be noted that the specifications are 
measuring slightly different things and should thus be interpreted slightly differently.  The 
individual responses are significantly correlated with the cell averages, so the averages do serve 
as a proxy.  However, including the averages directly in the regression is really a test of the 
importance of the broader investment climate experienced by similar types of firms to a firm’s 
growth.  The effect of the environment may indeed have larger effects. 
In considering the possible feedback from employment growth to measures of the 
investment climate, a case could be made for feedback to occur in either direction, making it an 
empirical question as to which force is likely to dominate.  For finance, one would expect that   25
firms that are growing would be better able to qualify for financing, making it more likely that 
they would have external loans from banks.  On the other hand, firms that are growing are also 
likely to have higher revenues and retained earnings, making the need to secure external 
financing less acute.  Measures of lagged expansion included in the regressions presented in 
Table 4 (objective conditions experienced by firms), indicate that contracting firms are actually 
more likely to have external financing than expanding firms, and both are more likely than stable 
firms to have external financing. Cell average yields substantially higher benefits of finance than 
what would be estimated with individual firm level values. This suggests a negative feedback 
from employment growth to external finance, which if not accounted for reduces the estimated 
effect of access to finance on firm growth. It may also reflect a positive effect of improved 
access to finance in other firms.   
For corruption and interactions with government officials there are two potential 
channels.  On the one hand, growing firms may be targets for more demands for additional 
payments and may need to get more permissions to expand their operations.  On the other hand, 
these firms may have greater recourse to avoiding demands for payments, and many of the more 
time-consuming interactions may have to do with downsizing, such as restrictions on firing 
workers or filing for protection from creditors.  Again, looking at lagged growth, it is the 
contracting firms that report significantly more demands for bribes, more frequent inspections 
and longer times dealing with officials. In both cases, the coefficient for micro firms is positive 
but larger when using IC averages. This suggests a negative feedback from employment growth 
to corruption and regulations.  
The feedback from employment growth to infrastructure is less clear.  It is possible that 
growing firms would have greater access to private solutions to failures in the public grid so that 
controlling for endogeneity would raise the impact yet results do not suggest such effect as the 
coefficient on power failures declines when using IC-variables. Growth externalities across firms 
that fail to secure power may be driving this result.  
There is another dimension along which endogeneity may matter, namely whether there 
is a selection bias such that better performing firms select into better locations.  To address this, 
the regression is repeated, excluding those firms that are most likely to be mobile or choosing 
among a number of locations in setting up their business.  Column 4 in Table 6 thus excludes 
foreign-owned firms and large firms, only including smaller domestic firms.  Results hold,   26
except for infrastructure, where the effect of medium-sized firms ceases to be statistically 
significant.  
 
Alternative Definitions of Firm Size 
Table 7 examines how sensitive our results are to the size category definitions and the 
importance of the inclusion of firms with fewer than 10 employees. The results indicate that 
there is a sharp divide between the effects of investment climate constrains on micro firms on 
one side and small, medium and large firms on another.  This insight can be lost if  “small” firms 
are either defined so broadly as to encompass micro firms, or simply exclude them.   
To explore the differences within the smaller sizes of firm, Table 7 shows the results of 
(1) excluding firms with fewer than five employees (column 1), (2) combining the remaining 
micro and small into a single category (column 2), and (3) excluding all micro altogether 
(column 3).  Excluding firms with fewer than five employees from the sample hardly alters the 
results, indicating that firms in the 1-4 employee range behave similar to firms in the 5-10 (see 
Table 7, column 1, and Table 6, column 1).   
Excluding firms with fewerthan 5 employees and combining the remaining micro and 
small firms into a single category (column 2), mutes a number of messages.  It is still the case 
that it is the smallest category of firms that benefit most from additional access to finance, but 
now the overall effect is smaller, as are the differences across size groups.  The effects of 
regulations are also different; the direct effect remains, but there is now no significant 
differences across size categories in terms of coefficients or overall impact; the expanded 
definition of “small” masks the differential impact between those with less or more than 10 
employees.  The differential impact of bribes is also more muted.  Omitting all micro firms 
altogether (column 3) provides very similar results; combining firms with 5-10 employees has an 
effect similar to that of excluding them altogether, losing the richness of the differences of the 
impact on micro and small firms.   
 
7. Robustness 
The paper examines two issues in testing for the robustness of the results. First it looks at the 
effects of using other investment climate variables to measure access to finance in the multiple 
constraints specifications.  Second, it looks to see how sensitive the results are to the exclusion of 
a particular income group or regions.   27
 
Different Investment Climate Variables 
Table 8 and 9 extend the results by substituting other variables within the four basic investment 
climate areas.  The results remain strong.  Given the large number of possible combinations, we 
focused on issues of finance (Table 8) and on issues of regulations and corruption (Table 9); 
differences in the regulation variables have been discussed above. Comparing columns (1), (2) 
and (3) in Table 8 demonstrates that each measure of finance is associated with benefits that 
decline with size.  Across measures, the benefits appear largest for access to external working 
capital. Firms may be more likely to take on additional workers if they are able to pay wages on 
a regular basis even in the face of uncertain cash flows.  In terms of overall impact, all three 
indicate significant differences in comparing micro and small firms, but not between micro and 
large or small and large firms.   
 
Different Samples   
One important concern in cross-country analysis is that some outlier countries or regions drive 
the results.  This issue is addressed here by examining the robustness of the results to the 
exclusion of one group of countries at the time (see table 10). Results are found to be very 
robust.  Excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) reduces somewhat the impact of 
finance.  It remains positive, but smaller and without the same variation across sizes of firms 
when that region is excluded.  Thus, that larger firms benefit somewhat less from greater access 
to finance seems predominantly an effect in that region.  The positive impact of bribes in 
promoting micro firms is somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of regions, although the level of 
significance is generally below 15 percent.  Overall, the tables confirm that around the world, 
better access to finance and better business regulations is associated with higher firm growth for 
all firms, while lower corruption and, to a lesser extent, better access to infrastructure are 




This paper has provided new evidence of the role of the investment climate on employment 
growth. The results indicate significant differences across size categories of firms—both in terms 
of differences in objective conditions faced by firms and in terms of non-linearities in the impact   28
of these conditions.  Low access to finance, corruption, poorly developed business regulations 
and infrastructure bottlenecks shift downward the size distribution of employment.  Low access 
to finance and ineffective business regulations reduce the growth of all firms, especially micro 
and small firms. Corruption and poor infrastructure create growth bottlenecks for medium and 
large firms. The results also reinforce the importance of differentiating the impact across size 
classes of firms that allow for the micro firms (less than 10 employees) to be different from 
“small” firms.   
This paper confirms previous results on the importance of access to finance for micro and 
small firms.  It contributes to the existing knowledge in finance in various fronts. It shows that 
the impact on employment growth of an extra unit of external finance is highest for these firms.  
It also compares the effects of different forms of financing on employment growth and finds that 
access to working capital has the highest effects of all. Firms may be more likely to take on 
additional workers if they are able to pay wages on a regular basis even in the face of uncertain 
cash flows.   
What are the aggregate implications of these findings for the size, efficiency and 
dynamism of the business sector in developing countries? Regarding size, our estimates suggest 
that a weak investment climate reduces overall employment in the business sector.  By way of 
example, in Argentina and Mexico increasing the share of external financing for investments by 
10 percentage points would increase overall employment by 5 percentage points.  The same 
increase in finance for working capital would raise employment by 8 percentage points.  In 
Argentina, reducing the incidence of corruption by 10 percentage points would increase overall 
employment in the business sector by 0.5 percentage points.
26 
Concerning the efficiency and dynamism of the business sector, we can only make some 
tentative points.  As pointed out by Tybout (2000), it is not necessarily the case that small firms 
are less efficient than large firms as long as they concentrate in the production of goods and 
services with limited returns to scale. Yet, even if that is the case, our findings may have a 
bearing on the dynamism and growth of the business sector. When the business climate is weak, 
firms may be confined to industries with limited innovation and growth opportunities. In 
addition, a larger share of firms may remain informal or semi-informal, reducing the capacity of 
                                                 
26 These computations make use of data on the size distribution of employment obtained from the database used by 
Barstelman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004 and 2005)   29
the state of collecting taxes and paying for fundamental inputs for development such as 
education.  
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Income Level Low Lower-middle Upper-middle High Total
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
size 1-10 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.051 0.00
size 11-50 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.120 0.00
size 51-200 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.117 0.04
size 201-500 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.095 0.02
size + 500 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.074 0.00
age 1-5 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.21 0.05
age 6-15 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00
age +16 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00
Total 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00




Name of the variable  Description mean sd
IC-Subjective Finance Access/cost of finance is a firm's constraint rank 0-4 (demeaned
1) 0.32 1.1
Consistency  of Regulations Officials interpretation of regulations is consistent
2  3.30 1.50
IC-Subjective Labor Regulations Labor regulations is a problem to operations rank 0-4 (demeaned
1) -0.24 0.99
IC-Subjective Corruption Corruption is a problem to operations rank 0-4 (demeaned
1) 0.28 1.1
IC-Subjective Electricity Electricity is a problem to operations rank 0-4  (demeaned
1) -0.04 1.27
Overdraft Firm has overdraft facility (yes-no) 0.45 0.50
Sh-sales-cr Percentage of sales sold on credit 42.00 40.00
Sh-work.capital-fin Percentage of working capital financed externally 14.00 27.00
Sh-invest-fin Percentage of investments financed externally 20.00 34.00
Days-license Delay to obtain an operating license -last two years  (log-days) 24.00 68.00
Mng-time % of management's time dealing with government regulations 9.20 14.00
Days-inspections Total days spent on inspections  during last year (log) 13.00 28.00
Days-imports Average days to obtain imports from point of entry -last year (log) 8.30 14.00
Days-exports Average days to get exports cleared thru customs -last year  (log) 5.00 8.80
Days-labor-inspections Total days spent on labor inspections  last year (log) 3.27 10.42
Bribe y-n Firms in comparable activities bribe to get things done (yes-no) 0.39 0.49
Bribe (%) Percentage of sales on bribes to get things done by similar firms 1.80 5.70
Gift y-n Similar firms give gifts to officials during inspections (yes-no) 0.37 0.48
Gift (%) govmt contract % of government contracts on bribes by comparable firms 2.50 6.50
Days-no power Power outages experienced during the last year (log-days) 18.00 56.00
Loss power % Percentage of sales lost due to power outages during last year 4.80 9.60
Days no water Days of interrrumpted water supply during last year (log) 8.40 41.00
1 Perceptions are deviation from respondent's average constraints across all 18 issue areas
2 Rank: 1disagree - 6 agree
TABLE 2: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
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TABLE 3: SUBJECTIVE (PERCEIVED) BUSINESS CONSTRAINTS  BY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
ICsubjective= α+  ß1small + ß2medium + ß3large + ß4v.large + ß5mature + ß6older +  ß7smallcity + ß8exporter 
+ ß9foreign + ß10government + (ß11-ß32)*industry2-22 + (ß33-ß185)*survey-country-year + ε
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Finance









small -0.050*** 0.082*** 0.053*** -0.012 -0.023*
(0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
medium -0.136*** 0.142*** 0.121*** -0.039*** -0.030**
(0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
large -0.203*** 0.257*** 0.166*** -0.050*** -0.035*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
v.large -0.207*** 0.264*** 0.198*** -0.075*** -0.045*
(0.022) (0.033) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
mature -0.001 -0.026 0.021** 0.023* -0.022*
(0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
older -0.041*** 0.004 0.034*** 0.008 -0.001
(0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
exporter -0.030*** 0.195 0.035*** -0.022* -0.024*
(0.012) (0.128) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
foreign -0.304*** 0.100*** 0.032*** 0.009 0.014
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 55182 42673 55770 55027 56683
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
1 Perceptions are deviation from respondent's average constraints across all 18 issue areas
2 rank 1-6; Higher values indicates higher perceived consistency in regulations    36
TABLE 4:OBJECTIVE (EXPERIENCED) BUSINESS CONSTRAINTS  BY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE        
(IC variable)
small medium large  v.large mature older exporter foreign expanding contracting Obs. Rsq
FINANCE
overdraft (yes/no) 0.102*** 0.218*** 0.292*** 0.296*** 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.005 0.024*** -0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 37175 .33
sh-sales-cr (%) 7.478*** 9.864*** 9.868*** 8.388*** 0.955** 1.203*** 2.896*** 4.863*** 3.797*** 5.174***
(0.380) (0.478) (0.648) (0.783) (0.397) (0.460) (0.415) (0.480) (0.514) (0.748) 56592 .28
sh-work.capital-fin (%) 3.938*** 7.757*** 10.024*** 12.453*** 0.455 1.006*** 3.333*** -2.374*** 2.887*** 3.001***
(0.252) (0.352) (0.505) (0.656) (0.285) (0.342) (0.330) (0.365) (0.384) (0.545) 54449 .17
sh-invest-fin (%) 5.478*** 9.790*** 11.957*** 13.799*** 1.278*** 1.374** 2.491*** -3.407*** 3.687*** 2.612***
(0.429) (0.551) (0.724) (0.879) (0.448) (0.539) (0.480) (0.549) (0.597) (0.885) 36923 .16
REGULATIONS
days to get business license (log) 0.115*** 0.174*** 0.082 0.188*** -0.134*** -0.140*** 0.015 0.081** 0.060 0.114
(0.040) (0.046) (0.059) (0.071) (0.040) (0.044) (0.036) (0.038) (0.048) (0.075) 7968 .33
management time (%) 1.143*** 1.794*** 1.526*** 1.592*** 0.252* 0.550*** 0.700*** 0.392** 0.493** 1.756***
(0.154) (0.195) (0.243) (0.289) (0.147) (0.177) (0.158) (0.174) (0.209) (0.310) 52433 .16
days-inspections (log) 0.471*** 0.888*** 1.097*** 1.211*** 0.030 0.037 0.153*** 0.139*** -0.004 0.231***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.043) (0.052) (0.030) (0.034) (0.027) (0.032) (0.037) (0.052) 42524 .4
days-labor-inspections (log) 0.471*** 0.993*** 1.184*** 1.321*** 0.044 0.073 0.118*** 0.182*** -0.018 0.380***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.057) (0.068) (0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.044) (0.050) (0.068) 29102 .29
days-imports (log) -0.046* -0.095*** -0.126*** -0.166*** -0.052** 0.011 -0.130*** -0.102*** -0.031 -0.036
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) (0.038) 16460 .33
days-exports (log) -0.029 -0.053 -0.096** -0.114*** -0.086*** -0.056** -0.059*** -0.085*** -0.006 -0.088**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.041) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029) (0.042) 13461 .23
CORRUPTION
bribe (yes/no) 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.009 0.012 0.003 -0.017** 0.022*** -0.013* 0.047*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 42704 .2
bribe (% sales) -0.021 -0.385*** -0.411*** -0.458*** -0.110 -0.261*** -0.032 -0.121 0.133 0.422***
(0.071) (0.082) (0.111) (0.107) (0.071) (0.083) (0.068) (0.079) (0.085) (0.118) 42704 .11
gift to govmt. (yes/no) 0.002 -0.003 -0.022** -0.034*** -0.011** -0.030*** 0.016*** -0.013** 0.031*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 41534 .33
gift (% govmt contract) 0.194** -0.208** -0.456*** -0.497*** -0.049 -0.306*** -0.078 -0.218** 0.194** 0.865***
(0.082) (0.096) (0.106) (0.131) (0.087) (0.100) (0.072) (0.089) (0.098) (0.188) 38937 .15
INFRASTRUCTURE
days-no power (log) 0.170*** 0.199*** -0.066 -0.180*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.059* -0.081** 0.308*** 0.200***
(0.032) (0.041) (0.056) (0.068) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.040) (0.045) (0.065) 50439 .39
loss power (%) -0.233 -0.966*** -1.317*** -1.636*** 0.044 0.067 -0.067 -0.421** 0.472** 1.216***
(0.163) (0.185) (0.221) (0.231) (0.159) (0.177) (0.142) (0.170) (0.232) (0.374) 25889 .16
days no water (log) -0.011 -0.106*** -0.247*** -0.293*** 0.052 -0.000 -0.012 -0.106*** 0.171*** 0.049
(0.033) (0.040) (0.051) (0.062) (0.037) (0.041) (0.032) (0.039) (0.045) (0.060) 43456 .22
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Each row reports the results of a regression of an IC-variable on firms characteristics. Only a selection of coefficients reported.
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
ICobjective= α +  ß1small + ß2medium + ß3large + ß4v.large + ß5mature + ß6older +  ß7smallcity + ß8exporter + ß9foreign + ß10government +ß11expanding + ß12contracting  + 
(ß13-ß34)*industry2-22 + (ß35-ß184)*survey-country-year + ε
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TABLE 5: IMPACT  OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE (IC) ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  (one IC dimension) 
IC variable / RHS term IC small*IC medium*IC large*IC constant obs rsq
FINANCE
(1) overdraft (yes/no) 0.932*** -0.111** -0.082 -0.020 0.163
(0.062) (0.046) (0.061) (0.078) (0.103) 38870 .18
(2) sh-sales-cr (%) 0.005*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.343***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.053) 57252 .12
(3) sh-work.capital-fin (%) 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 0.480***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.045) 55895 .13
(4) sh-invest-fin (%) 0.006*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 0.501***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.047) 56065 .12
REGULATIONS
(5) days-license (log) 0.027* -0.018 -0.025 -0.023 0.359***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.097) 32049 .13
(6) management time (%) 0.013*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.445***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.057) 55923 .12
(7) days-inspections (log) 0.238*** -0.023 -0.049** -0.064*** -0.221**
(0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.109) 49007 .14
(8) days-labor-inspections (log) 0.237*** -0.101*** -0.104** -0.136*** 0.092
(0.034) (0.032) (0.041) (0.044) (0.098) 40879 .12
(9) days-exports (log) 0.023** -0.024** -0.029** -0.034** 0.553***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.051) 57628 .11
(10) days-imports (log) 0.017 -0.029*** -0.023 -0.018 0.552***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.051) 58283 .11
(11) Consistency of Regulations 0.043*** 0.025 -0.007 -0.006 0.457***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.062) 52208 .11
CORRUPTION
(12) bribe (yes/no) 0.143*** -0.133*** -0.256*** -0.281*** 0.533***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.057) (0.068) (0.061) 50708 .12
(13) bribe (%) -0.005 -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.613***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.053) 50708 .12
(14) gift to govmt (yes/no) 0.008 -0.050 -0.135** -0.113* 0.573***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.054) (0.066) (0.055) 53545 .11
(15) gift (% govmt contract) 0.001 -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 0.572***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.056) 51369 .11
INFRASTRUCTURE
(16) days-no power (log) 0.017** -0.008 -0.023*** -0.017** 0.519***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.055) 53655 .11
(17) loss power (% sales) -0.008*** -0.002 -0.005* -0.007* 0.506***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.089) 49482 .11
(18) days no water (log) -0.007 -0.009 -0.018** -0.014* 0.597***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.052) 53993 .11
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: IC variable -average country-size-industry3-city  
Each row number presents the results of a regression of employment growth on one IC. Only selected coefficients presented
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
Firm's employment growth=α +  ß1IC + ß2small*IC + ß3medium*IC + ß4large*IC + ß5mature + ß6older +  ß7smallcity + ß8exporter 
+ ß9foreign + ß10government + (ß11-ß12)*growth-period1-2 + (ß13-ß34)*industry2-22 + (ß35-ß184)*survey-country-year + ε
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TABLE 6: IMPACT  OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  (4 IC dimensions)



















Observations 44208 23162 23162 36707 44208
sh-invest-fin 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.000
small*sh-invest-fin -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic 0.021
medium*sh-invest-fin -0.002** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** se 0.017
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic 0.030
large*sh-invest-fin -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** se 0.011
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.010
se 0.017
mng-time 0.015*** 0.002*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.023*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) p(bIC + bICmd = 0) 0.000
small*mng-time -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.011*** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmi -0.061
medium*mng-time -0.009*** -0.002** -0.009*** -0.005** -0.014*** se 0.017
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmi -0.041
large*mng-time -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.012*** se 0.012
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.020
mng-time^2 -0.0003*** se 0.016
(0.0001)
bribe y-n 0.077* 0.027** 0.120** 0.045 0.068 p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.726
(0.043) (0.011) (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.011
small*bribe y-n -0.090** -0.037** -0.101** -0.045 -0.088** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.003
(0.038) (0.015) (0.047) (0.037) (0.038) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.073
medium*bribe y-n -0.173*** -0.061*** -0.205*** -0.162*** -0.171*** se 0.019
(0.049) (0.018) (0.057) (0.051) (0.050) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.033
large*bribe y-n -0.193*** -0.037* -0.225*** -0.180*** se 0.014
(0.051) (0.019) (0.062) (0.052) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.040
se 0.018
days-no power -0.002 0.008* -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.675
(0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.018
small*days-no power -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.144
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.024
medium*days-no power -0.020** -0.010 -0.020* -0.014 -0.020** se 0.019
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.005
large*days-no power -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 se 0.013
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.019
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.16 se 0.017
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: IC variable -average country-size-industry3-city  
Each column presents the results of a regression of employment growth on multiple IC. Only selected coefficients presented
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
###########################################################
#
Firm's employment growth=a +  ß1IC1 + ß2small*IC1 + ß3medium*IC1+ ß4large*IC1+  ß5IC2 + ß6small*IC2 + ß7medium*IC2+ ß8large*IC2+  
ß9IC3 + ß10small*IC3 + ß11medium*IC3+ ß12large*IC3+  ß13IC4 + ß14small*IC4 + ß15medium*IC4+ ß16large*IC4 + ß17mature + ß18v.mature+  
ß19smallcity + ß20exporter + ß21foreign + ß22government + (ß23-ß24)*growth-period1-2 + (ß25-ß3324)*industry_survey-country-year + ε
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small (11-50) 








Observations 40942 38442 28457
sh-invest-fin 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
small*sh-invest-fin -0.001 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.002
medium*sh-invest-fin -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** se 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic 0.017 0.006 -0.005
large*sh-invest-fin -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** se 0.012 0.011 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.019 -0.020 -0.015
se 0.017 0.020 0.016
mng-time 0.016*** 0.008*** 0.007*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) p(bIC + bICmd = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
small*mng-time -0.009*** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmi -0.066
medium*mng-time -0.010*** -0.002 -0.001 se 0.017
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmi -0.052 -0.010 -0.002
large*mng-time -0.011*** -0.002 -0.002 se 0.012 0.011 0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.014 -0.011 -0.017
se 0.016 0.020 0.016
bribe y-n 0.063 -0.002 -0.043 p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.994
(0.045) (0.031) (0.037) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.008 0.001 0.000
small*bribe y-n -0.062 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.001 0.045 0.000
(0.039) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.069
medium*bribe y-n -0.157*** -0.100*** -0.076** se 0.019
(0.050) (0.033) (0.037) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.022 -0.038 -0.029
large*bribe y-n -0.181*** -0.089* -0.095** se 0.015 0.013 0.014
(0.052) (0.049) (0.045) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.047 -0.036 -0.037
se 0.018 0.020 0.018
days-no power -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.294
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.006 0.005 0.003
small*days-no power -0.007 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.054 0.415 0.041
(0.008) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.032
medium*days-no power -0.023** -0.012* -0.015** se 0.019
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.014 -0.025 -0.030
large*days-no power -0.016 0.002 -0.007 se 0.014 0.013 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.017 0.003 -0.014
small -0.024 se 0.017 0.019 0.017
(0.026)
medium 0.001 -0.015 0.011
(0.033) (0.023) (0.027)
large -0.041 -0.102*** -0.036
(0.034) (0.038) (0.032)
R-squared 0.16 0.13 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: IC variable -average country-size-industry3-city  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city. 
Firm's employment growth=a +  ß1IC1 + ß2small*IC1 + ß3medium*IC1+ ß4large*IC1+  ß5IC2 + ß6small*IC2 + ß7medium*IC2+ ß8large*IC2+  ß9IC3 + 
ß10small*IC3 + ß11medium*IC3+ ß12large*IC3+  ß13IC4 + ß14small*IC4 + ß15medium*IC4+ ß16large*IC4 + ß17mature + ß18v.mature+  ß19smallcity + 
ß20exporter + ß21foreign + ß22government + (ß23-ß24)*growth-period1-2 + (ß25-ß3324)*industry survey-country-year + ε  40
 















Observations 44208 44208 44208
FINANCE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.014*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
small*FINANCE -0.000 -0.001 -0.003*** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic 0.021 -0.040 0.023
medium*FINANCE -0.002** -0.002*** -0.005*** se 0.017 0.023 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic 0.030 0.057 0.037
large*FINANCE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.008*** se 0.011 0.019 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.010 -0.098 -0.014
se 0.017 0.023 0.019
mng-time 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) p(bIC + bICmd = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
small*mng-time -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmi -0.061 -0.045 -0.065
medium*mng-time -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.009*** se 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmi -0.041 -0.030 -0.045
large*mng-time -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** se 0.012 0.011 0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.020 -0.015 -0.020
se 0.016 0.016 0.017
bribe y-n 0.077* 0.029 0.103** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.726 0.131 0.781
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.011 0.001 0.005
small*bribe y-n -0.090** -0.085** -0.113*** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.003 0.009 0.015
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.073 -0.053 -0.076
medium*bribe y-n -0.173*** -0.158*** -0.208*** se 0.019 0.019 0.020
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.033 -0.033 -0.041
large*bribe y-n -0.193*** -0.138*** -0.203*** se 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.040 -0.021 -0.036
se 0.018 0.019 0.019
days-no power -0.002 0.004 -0.002 p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.675 0.832 0.541
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.018 0.070 0.012
small*days-no power -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.144 0.237 0.335
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.024 -0.030 -0.015
medium*days-no power -0.020** -0.021** -0.021** se 0.019 0.020 0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.005 -0.011 -0.007
large*days-no power -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 se 0.013 0.015 0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.019 -0.019 -0.007
small -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.053** se 0.017 0.019 0.018
(0.025) (0.027) (0.023)
medium -0.057* -0.032 -0.038
(0.030) (0.034) (0.027)
large -0.109*** -0.071** -0.082***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.031)
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: IC variable -average country-size-industry3-city  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city. 
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
Firm's employment growth=a +  ß1IC1 + ß2small*IC1 + ß3medium*IC1+ ß4large*IC1+  ß5IC2 + ß6small*IC2 + ß7medium*IC2+ ß8large*IC2+  ß9IC3 + 
ß10small*IC3 + ß11medium*IC3+ ß12large*IC3+  ß13IC4 + ß14small*IC4 + ß15medium*IC4+ ß16large*IC4 + ß17mature + ß18v.mature+  ß19smallcity + 
ß20exporter + ß21foreign + ß22government + (ß23-ß24)*growth-period1-2 + (ß25-ß3324)*industry_survey-country-year + ε  41
 
TABLE 9: IMPACT  OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  (other regulatory and corruption indicators)
Firm's employment growth=a +  ß1IC1 + ß2small*IC1 + ß3medium*IC1+ ß4large*IC1+  ß5IC2 + ß6small*IC2 + 
ß7medium*IC2+ ß8large*IC2+  ß9IC3 + ß10small*IC3 + ß11medium*IC3+ ß12large*IC3+  ß13IC4 + ß14small*IC4 + 














Observations 44208 44208 44208
sh-invest-fin 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
small*sh-invest-fin -0.000 0.000 -0.000 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic 0.026 0.027 0.024
medium*sh-invest-fin -0.002* -0.002* -0.001* se 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic 0.030 0.034 0.032
large*sh-invest-fin -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** se 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.004 -0.007 -0.008
se 0.016 0.016 0.017
REGULATIONS 0.047*** 0.011 0.015*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.000 0.038 0.000
(0.014) (0.011) (0.002) p(bIC + bICmd = 0) 0.000 0.788 0.000
small*regulation 0.034** -0.031*** -0.007*** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.000 0.851 0.000
(0.014) (0.011) (0.001) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmi 0.062 -0.023 -0.059
medium*regulation 0.006 -0.007 -0.009*** se 0.058 0.027 0.017
(0.018) (0.015) (0.002) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmi 0.116 -0.058 -0.035
large*regulation 0.014 -0.013 -0.010*** se 0.047 0.019 0.012
(0.017) (0.016) (0.002) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.054 0.035 -0.024
se 0.051 0.025 0.017
CORRUPTION 0.112** 0.107** -0.009*** p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.366 0.909 0.000
(0.044) (0.003) (0.003) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.138 0.044 0.001
small*corruption -0.079** -0.103** -0.010** p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.025 0.008 0.000
(0.039) (0.041) (0.004) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.074 -0.078 -0.009
medium*corruption -0.169*** -0.184*** -0.012** se 0.019 0.019 0.008
(0.051) (0.051) (0.006) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic -0.027 -0.036 -0.022
large*corruption -0.198*** -0.209*** -0.013** se 0.015 0.015 0.008
(0.052) (0.052) (0.006) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.047 -0.042 0.012
se 0.018 0.018 0.008
days-no power -0.001 -0.003 0.006 p(bIC + bICsm = 0) 0.893 0.927 0.644
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) p(bIC + bICmed = 0) 0.077 0.038 0.014
small*days-no power 0.000 0.004 -0.002 p(bIC + bIClg = 0) 0.540 0.260 0.085
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - bIC*avgICmic -0.009 -0.015 -0.040
medium*days-no power -0.015 -0.016 -0.027*** se 0.019 0.019 0.017
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm - bIC*avgICmic 0.000 0.008 -0.002
large*days-no power -0.004 -0.007 -0.021** se 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (bIClg+bIC)*avgIClg - (bICsm+bIC)*avgICsm) -0.009 -0.022 -0.038
small -0.254*** -0.085*** -0.104*** se 0.018 0.017 0.016
(0.054) (0.030) (0.021)
medium -0.148** -0.105*** -0.102***
(0.068) (0.035) (0.028)
large -0.241*** -0.155*** -0.153***
(0.064) (0.036) (0.030)
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: IC variable -average country-size-industry3-city  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city. 
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
Firm's employment growth=a +  ß1IC1 + ß2small*IC1 + ß3medium*IC1+ ß4large*IC1+  ß5IC2 + ß6small*IC2 + ß7medium*IC2+ ß8large*IC2+  ß9IC3 + 
ß10small*IC3 + ß11medium*IC3+ ß12large*IC3+  ß13IC4 + ß14small*IC4 + ß15medium*IC4+ ß16large*IC4 + ß17mature + ß18v.mature+  ß19smallcity + 
ß20exporter + ß21foreign + ß22government + (ß23-ß24)*growth-period1-2 + (ß25-ß3324)*industry_survey-country-year + ε  42




INCOME LEVEL OMMITTED REGION OMMITTED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
low lower upper high AFR EAP ECA EHI LAC MENA SAS
Observations 35076 30781 31807 41449 39648 42382 27165 43028 36564 44935 44504
sh-invest-fin 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
small*sh-invest-fin -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
medium*sh-invest-fin -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
large*sh-invest-fin -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
mng-time 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.053
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.041)
small*mng-time -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.007*** -0.054
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.036)
medium*mng-time -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.004* -0.008*** -0.167***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.048)
large*mng-time -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.006** -0.005** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.005* -0.008*** -0.216***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.050)
bribe y-n 0.012 0.114** 0.068 0.050 0.064 0.040 0.096* 0.070* 0.094** 0.064 0.006***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.048) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042) (0.057) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042) (0.001)
small*bribe y-n -0.078* -0.087** -0.037 -0.071* -0.087** -0.085** -0.013 -0.075** -0.125*** -0.087** -0.000
(0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.046) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.001)
medium*bribe y-n -0.170*** -0.151*** -0.151** -0.170*** -0.205*** -0.180*** -0.065 -0.173*** -0.192*** -0.178*** -0.002**
(0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.049) (0.055) (0.049) (0.060) (0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.001)
large*bribe y-n -0.236*** -0.178*** -0.153** -0.189*** -0.216*** -0.177*** -0.165** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.195*** -0.003***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.061) (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.064) (0.051) (0.055) (0.050) (0.001)
days-no power -0.005 0.013 0.006 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002 0.038** -0.009 0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
small*days-no power 0.008 -0.011 -0.014* 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.018** -0.004 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
medium*days-no power -0.009 -0.035*** -0.024** -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.031*** -0.012 -0.034*** -0.022** -0.022**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
large*days-no power -0.010 -0.028** -0.017 0.002 -0.008 -0.010 -0.015 -0.003 -0.025** -0.015 -0.020*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTE: IC variable -average country-size-industry3-city  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-size-industry3-city. 
Omitted variables (micro 1-10, young1-5, capital&city>=1mn, textiles, Albania 2002)
Firm's employment growth=a +  ß1IC1 + ß2small*IC1 + ß3medium*IC1+ ß4large*IC1+  ß5IC2 + ß6small*IC2 + ß7medium*IC2+ ß8large*IC2+  ß9IC3 + ß10small*IC3 + 
ß11medium*IC3+ ß12large*IC3+  ß13IC4 + ß14small*IC4 + ß15medium*IC4+ ß16large*IC4 + ß17mature + ß18v.mature+  ß19smallcity + ß20exporter + ß21foreign + 
ß22government + (ß23-ß24)*growth-period1-2 + (ß25-ß3324)*industry_survey-country-year + ε
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TABLE A1: DATASET
country-year N. obs. Percent country-year N. obs. Percent country-year N. obs. Percent
Albania2002 170 0.25 Georgia2005 200 0.29 Oman2003 337 0.49
Albania2005 204 0.29 Germany2005 1,196 1.73 Pakistan2002 965 1.39
Algeria2002 557 0.8 Greece2005 546 0.79 Panama2006 604 0.87
Angola2006 540 0.78 Guatemala2003 455 0.66 Paraguay2006 613 0.88
Argentina2006 1,063 1.53 Guinea-Bissau2006 296 0.43 Peru2002 576 0.83
Armenia2002 171 0.25 Guinea-Conakry2006 327 0.47 Peru2006 632 0.91
Armenia2005 351 0.51 Guyana2004 163 0.24 Philippines2003 716 1.03
Azerbaijan2002 170 0.25 Honduras2003 450 0.65 Poland2002 500 0.72
Azerbaijan2005 350 0.51 Hungary2002 250 0.36 Poland2003 108 0.16
Bangladesh2002 1,001 1.44 Hungary2005 610 0.88 Poland2005 975 1.41
Belarus2002 250 0.36 India2000 895 1.29 Portugal2005 505 0.73
Belarus2005 325 0.47 India2002 1,827 2.64 Romania2002 255 0.37
Benin2004 197 0.28 Indonesia2003 713 1.03 Romania2005 600 0.87
Bhutan2001 98 0.14 Ireland2005 501 0.72 Russia2002 506 0.73
BiH2002 182 0.26 Jamaica2005 94 0.14 Russia2005 601 0.87
BiH2005 200 0.29 Kazakhstan2002 250 0.36 Rwanda2006 340 0.49
Bolivia2000 671 0.97 Kazakhstan2005 585 0.84 SaudiArabia2005 681 0.98
Bolivia2006 613 0.88 Kenya2003 284 0.41 Senegal2003 262 0.38
Botswana2006 444 0.64 Kosovo2003 329 0.47 Serbia2001 402 0.58
Brazil2003 1,642 2.37 Kyrgyzstan2002 173 0.25 Serbia2003 408 0.59
Bulgaria2002 250 0.36 Kyrgyzstan2003 102 0.15 Slovakia2002 170 0.25
Bulgaria2004 548 0.79 Kyrgyzstan2005 202 0.29 Slovakia2005 220 0.32
Bulgaria2005 300 0.43 Laos2005 246 0.35 Slovenia2002 188 0.27
BurkinaFaso2006 51 0.07 Latvia2002 176 0.25 Slovenia2005 223 0.32
Burundi2006 407 0.59 Latvia2005 205 0.3 SouthAfrica2003 603 0.87
Cambodia2003 503 0.73 Lebanon2006 354 0.51 SouthKorea2005 598 0.86
Cameroon2006 119 0.17 Lesotho2003 75 0.11 Spain2005 606 0.87
CapeVerde2006 47 0.07 Lithuania2002 200 0.29 SriLanka2004 452 0.65
Chile2004 948 1.37 Lithuania2004 239 0.34 Swaziland2006 429 0.62
China2002 1,548 2.23 Lithuania2005 205 0.3 Syria2003 560 0.81
China2003 2,400 3.46 Madagascar2005 293 0.42 Tajikistan2002 176 0.25
Colombia2006 1,000 1.44 Malawi2005 160 0.23 Tajikistan2003 107 0.15
CostaRica2005 343 0.49 Malaysia2002 902 1.3 Tajikistan2005 200 0.29
Croatia2002 187 0.27 Mali2003 155 0.22 Tanzania2003 276 0.4
Croatia2005 236 0.34 Mauritania2006 361 0.52 Tanzania2006 484 0.7
Czech Rep.2002 268 0.39 Mauritius2005 212 0.31 Thailand2004 1,385 2
Czech Rep.2005 343 0.49 Mexico2006 1,480 2.14 Turkey2002 514 0.74
DRC2006 444 0.64 Moldova2002 174 0.25 Turkey2005 1,880 2.71
DominicanRepublic2005 250 0.36 Moldova2003 103 0.15 Uganda2003 300 0.43
Ecuador2003 453 0.65 Moldova2005 350 0.51 Uganda2006 663 0.96
Egypt2004 977 1.41 Mongolia2004 195 0.28 Ukraine2002 463 0.67
Egypt2006 996 1.44 Montenegro2003 100 0.14 Ukraine2005 594 0.86
ElSalvador2003 465 0.67 Morocco2000 859 1.24 Uruguay2006 621 0.9
Estonia2002 170 0.25 Morocco2004 850 1.23 Uzbekistan2002 260 0.38
Estonia2005 219 0.32 Mozambique2002 194 0.28 Uzbekistan2003 100 0.14
Ethiopia2002 427 0.62 Namibia2006 429 0.62 Uzbekistan2005 300 0.43
FYROM2002 170 0.25 Nepal2000 223 0.32 Vietnam2005 1,650 2.38
FYROM2005 200 0.29 Nicaragua2003 452 0.65 Yugoslavia2002 250 0.36
Gambia2006 301 0.43 Niger2006 125 0.18 Yugoslavia2005 300 0.43
Georgia2002 174 0.25 Nigeria2001 232 0.33 Zambia2002 207 0.3
Total 69,305 100
Region Freq. Percent Income Freq. Percent
East Asia & Pacific 10,856 15.66 HighIncome: OECD 3,952 5.7
Europe & CentralAsia 20,191 29.13 HighIncome: non-OECD 1,092 1.58
Europe High Income 3,354 4.84 Low Income 17,282 24.94
Latin America & Caribbean 13,588 19.61 Lower Middle Income 30,286 43.7
Middle East & North Africa 6,171 8.90 Upper Middle Income 16,693 24.09
South Asia 5,461 7.88
Sub-Saharan Africa 9,684 13.97
Total 69,305 100.00 Total 69,305 100  44
TABLE A2: STRATIFICATION OF DATA BY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
SIZE CLASSES AGE CLASSES
size Freq. Percent Cum. age Freq. Percent Cum.
micro 1-10 20,289 29.27 29.27 young 1-5 13,286 19.17 19.17
small 11-50 23,770 34.3 63.57 mature 6-15 30,871 44.54 63.71
medium 51-200 13,211 19.06 82.63 older +16 24,400 35.21 98.92
large 201-500 5,650 8.15 90.79 unknown 748 1.08 100
very large +500 3,904 5.63 96.42 Total 69,305 100
unknown 2,481 3.58 100
Total 69,305 100
EXPORT ACTIVITY FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
non-exporter 53,639 77.4 77.4 domestic 59,622 86.03 86.03
exporter 13,609 19.64 97.03 foreign 8,806 12.71 98.73
unknown 2,057 2.97 100 unknown 877 1.27 100
Total 69,305 100 Total 69,305 100
EXPORT-FOREIGN (frequency) LOCATION
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
domestic foreign     Total capital/+1mn 36,623 52.84 52.84
non-exporter 48,500 4,852 53,352 small city 27,200 39.25 92.09
exporter 9,664 3,713 13,377 unknown 5,482 7.91 100
Total 58,164 8,565 66,729 Total 69,305 100
INDUSTRY 2-DIGIT INDUSTRY-CLASSIFICATION
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Textiles 4,488 6.48 6.48 capital-intense 21,263 30.68 65
Leather 1,255 1.81 8.29 labor-intense 23,783 34.32 34.32
Garments 7,105 10.25 18.54 services 18,791 27.11 92.11
Agroindustry 7,150 10.32 28.86 unknown 5,468 7.89 100
Beverages 1,764 2.55 31.4 Total 69,305 100
Metals&Machin 6,269 9.05 40.45
Electronics 2,150 3.1 43.55
Chem&Phamar 3,693 5.33 48.88
Construction 3,519 5.08 53.95
Wood&Furnit 3,847 5.55 59.51
Non-metal&plastic 3,292 4.75 64.26
Paper 677 0.98 65.23
BusServices 2,953 4.26 69.49
Other-Manufact 1,803 2.6 72.09
Adds-Marketing 693 1 73.09
otherservices 2,544 3.67 76.77
Retail&wholesale 8,821 12.73 89.49
Hotel&Restaurants 2,275 3.28 92.78
Transport 1,505 2.17 94.95
Mining&quarring 240 0.35 95.29
OtherTransportEquip 1,553 2.24 97.53
unknown 1,709 2.47 100
Total 69,305 100  